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I. Introduction
Since Granovetter’s ð1974Þ seminal work, it is widely recognized that job
referral plays an important role in the way the labor market works. There
are many different types of referrals ðe.g., by relatives, teachers, or previous
employersÞ. One kind of referral that has attracted the attention of econo-
mists is referral by current employees. This form of referral is thought to play
three possible roles: the transmission of information that is relevant to the
hiring process, the monitoring of workers after recruitment, and the reduc-
tion in search costs when attracting suitable workers is difﬁcult. In these
cases, referral enhances efﬁciency either by increasing effort and productivity
through employee monitoring ðKugler 2003; Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul
2005; Heath 2011Þ or by raising the quality of the match, either by pro-
viding employers with better information about workers ðSaloner 1985Þ or by
providing workers with better information about job characteristics ðSimon
and Warner 1992; Mortensen and Vishwanath 1994Þ. Referral can also be an
exchange of favors between employer, referee, and new recruit. In this case,
referral is a likely source of inefﬁciency and inequity since it distorts the
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recruitment process ðe.g., to favor friends and relatives; Barr and Oduro 2002;
Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul 2009Þ.1
Montgomery ð1991Þ provides an elegant formalization of screening through
employee referral. In his model, referral by employees is valuable because the
unobserved quality of a new worker is positively correlated with the revealed
quality of the current employee providing the reference. If the current employee
has proved to be of high quality, anyone referred by this employee is also more
likely to be of high quality. Underlying this assumption is the idea that social
ties are characterized by homophyly, and hence that characteristics of socially
proximate individuals are correlated ð Jackson 2008Þ. As Montgomery shows,
this assumption is sufﬁcient to induce employers to rely on referral from high-
quality employees. It does, however, assume that referees truthfully report the
information at their disposal. Whether this is the case in practice is unclear.
We test whether employee referral helps identify workers with better un-
observed characteristics at the time of hiring. We do this using recruitment
data from the British colonial army in Ghana, 1908–23. The conditions under
which the Gold Coast Regiment ðGCRÞ operated provide an excellent vantage
point from which to study employee referrals. The GCR was a big employer,
with a peacetime strength of about 1,500 rank and ﬁle drawn exclusively from
the indigenous population. Although there was a large army buildup during
World War I, universal conscription was never introduced, and the GCR had
to compete for labor on the labor market.
Until 1923, the army explicitly used referrals by fellow soldiers. Depending
on the year, 20%–80% of new enlistees were brought in by fellow soldiers,
often from their home village or region. In 1908–18 a ﬁnancial reward was
paid to the referee, and the army kept a record, which means that there is clear
and unambiguous information on employee referral. Another welcome fea-
ture is the homogeneous work conditions and skill requirements—compen-
sation was uniform for new recruits, and the tasks assigned to them were fairly
basic and relatively similar. We thus have a large number of observations rel-
ative to a single employer seeking many workers with similar characteristics
and using employee referral in a systematic way.
Since the colonial army remunerated servicemen who brought suitable new
recruits, we expect referral to be beneﬁcial to the army as an employer. Given
the context, better monitoring is unlikely to have been the main motive. This
leaves two likely candidates: identifying recruits with better unobserved char-
1 Goldberg ð1982Þ argues that less competitive industries canmaximize utility rather than proﬁts, and
this allows them to rely on nepotism. Since we only have data from one employer, we cannot test
Goldberg’s conjecture.
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acteristics or reduction in recruitment and search costs. In the ﬁrst case, we
expect referred recruits to have better hidden characteristics than unreferred
ones; in the second case, this need not be true. This observation forms the basis
of our testing strategy.
One key characteristic for army work is physical strength, a trait that is cor-
related with height. Other relevant characteristics include loyalty and dis-
cipline. Height is observable at recruitment; loyalty and discipline are only
revealed later. If referees bring in better soldiers, new recruits referred by ser-
vicemen should over time be revealed to have better unobserved characteris-
tics. The Ghanaian colonial army offers a convenient vantage point into this
issue. Unlike other employment contracts, army recruits cannot leave of their
own accord. If they do, it is recorded as desertion and can be prosecuted. Em-
ployee dismissal is also under the control of the employer, who customarily
records the reason for termination. We therefore have a clear record of em-
ployees’ revealed performance as seen by the employer.
Using army records covering enlistments over 1908–23, we compare the
initial physical ability and subsequent performance of referred and unreferred
recruits. We also test whether referred recruits brought in by higher-rank ser-
vicemen are better than those brought by unpromoted soldiers: if the hid-
den characteristics of socially proximate individuals are correlated, then bet-
ter workers should bring in better recruits. This assumes that referees report
information truthfully. They may however behave opportunistically, either
to obtain the reward or to ward off pressure from superiors to bring in new re-
cruits. Referee opportunism would lower the unobserved quality of new re-
cruits, perhaps even below that of unreferred recruits. If this is the case, then
the army must derive some other beneﬁt from employee referral ðe.g., reduc-
tion in recruitment costÞ for the practice to be encouraged and remunerated.
To deter opportunistic referral, the army may penalize soldiers who refer
low-quality recruits, for instance, by reducing their chance of promotion. We
do not observe this directly, but, if this were the case, soldiers who have no
more promotion prospects would be harder to penalize for bringing in worse
recruits. Consequently, if referee opportunism is present and the army pe-
nalizes bad referees by lowering promotion chances, we expect that high-
rank soldiers should refer recruits of lower unobserved quality than low-rank
referees.
Results strongly reject the idea that, in the case of the Ghanaian colonial
army, employee referral improved the unobserved quality of recruits. While
referred recruits were usually taller than unreferred ones, they were also more
likely to desert or be dismissed as inefﬁcient or unﬁt. Furthermore, recruits
referred by higher-ranked servicemen were of lower quality than those referred
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by low-rank soldiers. These results survive a battery of robustness checks to
which we subject them. Our ﬁndings are consistent with referee opportun-
ism, and they may explain why after World War I the colonial army stopped
rewarding servicemen for bringing in new recruits.
These results contribute to the literature in several ways. First, much of the
currently available evidence on employee referral comes from developed econ-
omies with large and active labor markets. Little evidence relates to other parts
of the world, either now or in the past. We offer evidence from Africa during
the colonial period. Our ﬁndings are different, suggesting that results obtained
in one context may not be applicable elsewhere.
In developed economies, referred workers have often been shown to earn
higher wages, have higher productivity, and enjoy lower turnover and higher
tenure than other workers ðCorcoran, Datcher, and Duncan 1980; Datcher
1983; Korenman and Turner 1996; Holzer 1997; Kugler 2003Þ.2 Similar re-
sults were found in Egypt by Antoninis ð2006Þ, who reports a positive cor-
relation between the start-up wage in an manufacturing ﬁrm and referral by a
former colleague. Such ﬁndings have been interpreted as evidence of better
match quality for referred workers. However, they suffer from potential sources
of bias, such as survivor bias and variation in skill levels by recruitment chan-
nel. They could also be manifestations of employer nepotism, as, for instance,
suggested by Barr and Oduro ð2002Þ. Our test is not subject to the same am-
biguity because all new indigenous recruits in the colonial army were given
identical pay and contract conditions. Unlike a start-up wage, the measures of
performance that we use cannot be suspected of reﬂecting favoritism: deserters
were hunted down and jailed ðor even shotÞ, and their deferred salary was not
paid—hardly an expression of favoritism by employers.
That truth-telling need not be incentive compatible has long been recog-
nized by the economic literature on contracts.3 We ﬁnd that a similar prob-
lem may affect referral by employees. Our context and ﬁndings are in line with
recent experimental evidence gathered by Beaman and Magruder ð2012Þ in
modern day India. The authors asked experimental participants to refer people
for a task. Referees were paid either a ﬁxed amount per referral or an amount
2 Different ﬁndings are reported by Bentolila, Michelacci, and Suarez ð2010Þ. Using data from the
United States and European Union, the authors ﬁnd that referrals through family, friends, or other
contacts ðnot necessarily of those whose productivity is known to the employerÞ lower start-up wages
but also the length of the unemployment spell. They interpret their results as suggesting that referral
is used to shorten a search, with the downside of lowering match quality, reﬂected in lower wages.
3 Fafchamps ð2004Þ, e.g., presents evidence that there is little information sharing among African
ﬁrms, making collective punishment for breach of contract difﬁcult if not impossible. The explana-
tion he offers is that entrepreneurs seldom regard the provided information as reliable, unless they
know and trust the source of the information.
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contingent on the performance of the referred person. Beaman and Magruder
ð2012Þ ﬁnd that when payment for referral is contingent on performance,
participants are less likely to refer a relative and more likely to refer a high
performer. These ﬁndings suggest that, unless truth-telling is incentivized, ref-
erees are at least partly motivated by the exchange of favors with friends and
relatives or some other form of referee opportunism. The authors also ﬁnd
that the effect of the incentive on the quality of referrals depends on the quality
of the referee: participants of low ability show little capacity to recruit high-
performing referrals. This suggests that high-ability referees are able to identify
high-ability referrals as assumed by Montgomery ð1991Þ, but need not do so
unless they have the right incentive. We come to similar conclusions by com-
paring the unobserved quality of recruits referred by soldiers who can and
cannot easily be penalized for bringing a poor-quality recruit. We ﬁnd that ref-
eree quality is lower when referees are harder to penalize.
The article is organized as follows. Background information on the GCR
is provided in Section II, and the data are discussed in Section III. Our test-
ing strategy is outlined in Section IV, and empirical results are presented in
Section V.
II. Background
The GCR was a big supraregional employer, with a peacetime strength of
about 1,500 men.4 Its primary role was to maintain internal security, safe-
guarding against unrest and uprisings such as the one in Ashanti in 1901.
Rarely, the GCR was involved in punitive expeditions.
All commissioned ofﬁcers in the GCR were British, but the entire rank and
ﬁle was drawn from the indigenous population, with a signiﬁcant share of
recruits ð20%–40%Þ originating from neighboring colonies. Universal con-
scription was never introduced, and the GCR had to compete for labor on the
labor market, particularly with mining and cocoa farming and other forms of
employment, most importantly own-account farming. Military service at that
time involved unskilled labor with little degree of differentiation. The ideal
recruit was a man who was loyal and amenable to discipline. All new recruits
received the same pay.
Various recruitment methods were used. First, recruiting parties toured an
area encouraging men to enlist. Second, chiefs who, under the system of “in-
direct rule” acted as agents of the colonial administration, were asked to pro-
vide recruits using ﬁnancial inducement and coercion. Third, until 1923 sol-
diers of the GCR were explicitly encouraged to bring new recruits, often from
4 This section draws heavily on the excellent work of Killingray ð1982Þ.
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their home village or region. From 1908 until the end of World War I, a prac-
tice of “bringing in money” was systematically applied: upon acceptance of a
new recruit, the bringer received a payment equivalent to about a week’s pay.5
The recruitment channels by year of enlistment are summarized in ﬁgure 1.
Recruits had to pass certain minimum requirements laid down in ofﬁcial
army handbooks, although ofﬁcers had some discretion in enforcing these
rules. Among the easily observable requirements were height and chest cir-
cumference, which were used to screen the health and physical ﬁtness of po-
tential recruits. The standard contractual length of service was 6 years with
the colors plus 3 years on the reserve. In late 1916 an additional category be-
came commonplace: recruits could choose to serve until the war ended. In
our sample, 34.6% and 57.3% of the recruits had “6 1 3” and “duration of
war” recorded as terms of enlistment on their attestation papers, respectively.6
Extensions were possible but required the approval of the army.
The GCR maintained several bases of varying size across Ghana. The two
main bases were Kumasi and Accra, where 65% of the recruits in our sample
5 Killingray ð1982Þ, 273, mentions an amount “varying from ﬁve shillings to ten shillings” ðreferring
to 1896Þ.
6 Residual categories were 2 years ð6.4% of recruitsÞ, 12 years ð0.9%Þ, and 3 years ð0.8%Þ. Results
are robust when limiting our analysis to the “6 1 3” and “duration of war” categories only.
Figure 1. Recruitment channels by year of enlistment
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were attested and where the practice of referrals was equally common.7 Re-
ferrals were widely practiced across the country, albeit with some variation
ðe.g., they were used more often in some of the peripheral and poorer areas of
the northÞ.
Referee and referred were unlikely to work together. About 10% of the ref-
erees were ex-GCR members serving, at the time of referral, in the organi-
zationally separate paramilitary police force in northern Ghana and in the
reserve. New recruits joined a training unit for the ﬁrst 6 months of their
service, after which they were transferred to regular units.8 There is no evi-
dence that referred recruits were treated differently in placement. In our data
set we have at least ﬁve battalions and 16 companies. Daily contact and di-
rect oversight is likely to have taken place at the platoon level. Under ran-
dom placement, the likelihood that the referee and referred were in the same
company or platoon is about 6% and less than 1%, respectively.
Once the recruit was accepted and had sworn his oath, he was subject to
military law. This meant that punishments for breaches of discipline could be
imposed, including ﬁnes, drill, general fatigue work, detention, and impris-
onment ðWAFF 1923Þ. Moreover, the army withheld about one-third of the
soldier’s basic pay as compulsory saving until completion of service. This pol-
icy acted as deterrent against desertion.
Local recruits all had to earn promotion through the ranks, on the basis of
merit and ability. Africans were not allowed to hold positions of responsi-
bility that would place them over white army men. Hence, the highest rank
that Africans could reach after long and distinguished service was regimental
sergeant major ðRSMÞ. Promotion, however, paid off. The basic daily rate
of pay for a private was 1 shilling. This increased to 1.25, 1.5, and 3 shillings
for a corporal, sergeant, and company sergeant major ðCSMÞ, respectively.
In addition, the military offered living allowances and occasional gratuities
and rewards; nonmonetary beneﬁts included uniforms, housing, and medi-
cal care.
World War I dramatically increased the demand for recruits as GCR troops
were used in Togoland ð1914Þ, the Cameroons ð1914–16Þ, and especially the
east African campaign ð1917–18Þ. About 7,000 men enlisted in the GCR
during the war, compared to a yearly intake of about 200 recruits in peace-
time. The years 1917 and 1918 stand out, with 3,800 and 1,600 new recruits,
respectively. These numbers were obtained along the recruiting channels
mentioned above: recruiting parties were intensiﬁed, and chiefs had to fulﬁll
quotas. Recruitment was extended to ethnic groups and areas previously not—
7 For summary statistics and maps, see online app. A.
8 Only 15 referrals came from a referee in the training unit.
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or less—targeted such as Ashanti and the coastal peoples of Ghana and Togo.
Physical requirements were also reduced. Traveling by sea to ﬁght in east Af-
rica was extremely unpopular. Consequently, new recruits were guarded and
quickly shipped to east Africa before even completing their training. Corporal
punishment ðﬂoggingÞ, abolished in 1908, was reintroduced in 1917 to pre-
vent absenteeism and desertion.
Outside options were a likely cause of desertion. They varied over time. For
example, desertions of soldiers who were farmers before enlistment follow a
seasonal pattern with rates twice as high in May–July ðcocoa harvest in south-
ern GhanaÞ and October/November ðharvest in the northÞ. During World
War I the labor market was suppressed generally. Cocoa production was less
dynamic during the war, and cocoa prices fell due to lower demand; not all
cocoa pods were collected, and production decreased in 1917. During World
War I, miners were sacked because of a lack of explosives. Literate soldiers
who left the army legally could ﬁnd employment as clerks and command a
higher wage than illiterate farmers in the cocoa economy. Working as a clerk
would presumably have been more difﬁcult for a deserter.
III. Data
The data used in this study were collected frommilitary personnel records held
by the General Headquarters of the Ghana Armed Forces in Accra, Ghana.
We drew a complete sample of recruits enlisted between 1912 and 1923. We
had more difﬁculty locating recruits from 1908 to 1911, who are somewhat
underrepresented. Overall, the raw data set consists of 7,616 ﬁghting troops
and 844 motor drivers.
The army collected a wealth of information on each recruit, including his
age, place of birth, ethnicity, and previous occupation. Additionally, height
and chest circumference were measured as part of a routine medical exami-
nation. Summary statistics are given in table 1. The circumstances by which
the recruit entered the army were recorded on attestation papers. Entries in
the ﬁeld “Bringer” fall into three categories: ðaÞ referrals by a fellow soldier
stating his name, rank, and regimental number; ðbÞ recruits sent by chiefs;
and ðcÞ volunteers. Around 34% of soldiers were recruited through a bringer,
another 23% were sent by chiefs, and 8% are recorded as having volun-
teered. The rest were recruited directly by the army.9 We identiﬁed 1,127
bringers, who account for 2,837 referrals. The majority took on the role of
9 We suspect that “volunteers” is not a distinct recruitment category but were hired directly by the
army as well.
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TABLE 1
SUMMARY STATISTICS
Variable Observations Mean SD Min Max
Characteristics at time of recruitment:
Height ðcmÞ 8,295 168.1 7.3 125.73 203.2
Chest circumference ðcmÞ 8,134 85.4 5.3 63.5 139.7
Age ðyearsÞ 8,269 24.2 4.9 14 55
Recruiting channel:
Referral 8,460 34.2%
Sent by chief 8,460 22.8%
Volunteered 8,460 7.9%
Direct recruitment by army 8,460 35.0%
Deserted 8,460 11.1%
Dismissed as medically unfit/inefficient/for
misconduct 8,460 16.3%
Bringer ðyes 5 1Þ 8,460 3.4%
Rank of bringer at the time of referral:*
Low rank:
Private 8,460 9.2%




Company sergeant major and regimental
sergeant major 8,460 6.8%
Unknown and other ðmalam, pay clerk, etc.Þ 8,460 5.4%
Bringer is kin 8,460 2.9%




Literate ðyes 5 1Þ 8,460 6.7%
Skills in previous occupation ð1 unskilled to
5 skilledÞ:
Unskilled ðlaborer, carrier, boy, etc.Þ 7,923 13.4%
Semiskilled ðcook, steward, sawyer,
fisherman, etc.Þ 7,923 7.1%
Skilled ðcarpenter, tailor, goldsmith, etc.Þ 7,923 8.9%
Semiprofessional ðclerk, trader, schoolboyÞ 7,923 4.6%
Professional ðengineer, teacher, etc.Þ 7,923 .9%
Conditions of employment:
Distance between place of birth and enlistment
ðin 100 kmÞy 3,860 1.83 1.71 0 6.6
Motor transport unit 8,460 .10
Enlisted in World War I 8,460 .81
Enlisted in 1917–18 8,460 .64
Military conditions at time of recruitment:
Desertion rate in the 12 months before
enlistment 8,460 7.4 2.3 0 18.2
Dismissal rate in the 12 months before
enlistment 8,460 6.7 6.9 0 48.9
Time at risk 12 months before
enlistment ðsoldier yearsÞ 8,460 1,783.8 1,371.3 1 5,151.6
* Calculated over all recruits; proportions sum to 34%.
y For Ghanaian recruits only
bringer on only one occasion; 96% of bringers referring less than 10 recruits
account for 70% of all referrals. A small number of ðlong-servingÞ soldiers
were active recruiters: 46 bringers in varying positions ranging from malam
ða Muslim “military chaplain”Þ, pay clerk, and private to RSM account for
referrals of the remaining 928 recruits. We know from secondary sources that
the bringer was compensated; the actual compensation amount was unfor-
tunately not recorded on attestation papers, which are our primary source of
information.
Personnel ﬁles contain information on the soldier’s conduct and career
within the army. The cause of discharge is an excellent indicator of a soldier’s
quality from the point of view of the army. “Deserted,” “inefﬁcient,” “medi-
cally unﬁt,” and “misconduct” are categories that indicate poor performance
as seen by the employer, whereas the remaining categories such as “demobili-
zation” or “completion of service” indicate good performance. The cross-
tabulation of frequencies is presented in table 2. It is clearly evident that the
GCR as an employer had massive problems recruiting reliable, physically ﬁt,
capable men: one-fourth of enlisted recruits did not meet these requirements
ex post ði.e., they deserted or were discharged as “medically unﬁt” or “inefﬁ-
cient” or for “misconduct”Þ. Casualty rates were low in the African campaigns
ðKillingray 1978Þ.10 In our analysis, we treated these men as good quality
soldiers.
A substantial proportion ð38%Þ of the attestation papers are silent on ter-
mination. After the war, the army modiﬁed its system for recording details of
TABLE 2







Cause of Discharge Number % Number % Number % Number % Number %
Deserted 419 14 234 12 55 8 229 8 937 11
Dismissed as inefficient 231 8 55 3 16 2 79 3 381 5
Dismissed as medically unfit 318 11 254 13 41 6 277 9 890 11
Dismissed for misconduct 57 2 20 1 6 1 26 1 109 1
Other 1,870 65 1,370 71 553 82 2,350 79 6,143 73
Total 2,895 1,933 671 2,961 8,460
Note. “Other” summarizes causes of discharge that indicate a soldier of good quality such as “cessation of
hostilities” ð18.0%Þ, “completion of service” ð8.1%Þ, “died” ð3.4%Þ, and “killed in action” ð.8%Þ. For 42.4%
of the soldiers, the cause of discharge was not entered on the attestation paper but is most likely related
to a regular termination of contract.
10 In our sample, 0.8% and 3.4% of the soldiers were recorded as “killed in action” and to have
“died,” respectively. At 1.5% and 4.0%, rates were slightly higher among referred recruits.
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discharge. It appears that information is missing for recruits who completed
their service normally. Only those who deserted or were dismissed early were
recorded on attestation papers.11 In our analysis, we assume that if the date of
discharge is missing on attestation papers, the soldier served at least until the
end of World War I and demobilized at some unknown later date.12 The pro-
portion of desertions and dismissals is summarized in ﬁgure 2 by year of en-
listment cohort.
IV. Testing Strategy
There may be multiple reasons why employers recruit individuals referred by
their workers. Here we focus on screening and saving on recruitment costs,
which are the most likely candidates given the context. Monitoring is unlikely
to have been a reason, given that referee and referred served in different units
and hence were hardly ever in a position to monitor each other. Since other
possible motives cannot be tested with the data at hand, we focus the pre-
sentation of our testing strategy on what we can empirically investigate. A
detailed discussion of identiﬁcation issues can be found in the appendix. We
focus here on the main intuition behind our testing strategy.
Let q stand for the quality of a new recruit, and let R 5 1 if the recruit is
referred by another soldier, and 0 otherwise. Recruit quality q can be divided
into components h that are observable at the time of hiring ðsuch as heightÞ
and unobservable components d ðsuch as loyalty and sense of disciplineÞ. Let
q 5 f ðh, d Þ.
A. Screening
If worker referral serves a screening purpose, it helps employers select new
recruits with better unobserved characteristics. In this case we expect that
referred recruits prove to be more loyal and disciplined:13
11 The numbers of deserters in our data agree with ﬁgures reported by the governor to the secretary of
state ðThomas 1975Þ. Individual entries of desertions and dismissals also match the 1914–15 Star
Medal Roll of the GCR. The roll lists the name and regimental numbers of deserters and others who
were not eligible to the medal, which was awarded to all members of the GCR who were deployed in
Togo and Cameroon between August 5, 1914, and December, 31, 1915. Source: Service Medal Rolls
WO 329/2956, The National Archives, Kew.
12 This brings the number of soldiers ð4,653 ﬁghting troops and 693 motor driversÞ serving at the
end of World War I into line with estimates by Killingray ð1982Þ.
13 Referral could be a bad signal to the employer, for instance, because, as in Montgomery ð1991Þ,
the employer knows the referee to be of bad quality. In this case the employer would turn a referred
worker down—or offer worse employment conditions. Anticipating this, a job candidate could
simply volunteer instead of being referred, something that was always possible during the study
period. It follows that recruits who are recorded as referred should, in a screening model, always have
better unobserved quality.
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E ½d j h; R 5 1 > E ½d j h; R 5 0: ð1Þ
Screening models make less clear predictions about observable character-
istics h. Montgomery ð1991Þ assumes that the characteristics of referee and
referred are correlated in general. If this holds for both observables and un-
observables, we expect:14
E ½h j R 5 1 > E ½h j R 5 0: ð2Þ
Referral can serve a useful screening purpose for the employer even if ð2Þ is
violated. For instance, if the employer expects referred workers to have a
higher d, it may be optimal to hire them even if they have a lower h. The
important point is that a pure-screening model of referral would never predict
a situation in which referred recruits are better in terms of observable h but
worse in terms of unobservable d. Indeed, in this case referral would not
provide any valuable information since h is observable at the time of hir-
ing. This simple observation forms the basis of our testing strategy: if E ½d j h;
Figure 2. Desertions and dismissals by year of enlistment ðcohort effectsÞ
14 The maximum reward that the employer is willing to pay for a referral is E ½q j R 5 12
E ½q j R 5 0. If the reward necessary to incentivize the bringer is smaller than this maximum, referral
is optimal for the employer and should be observed in the data.
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R 5 1 < E ½d j h; R 5 0, then screening on unobservables cannot be the
motive for using employee referral.
B. Saving on Recruitment Costs
Equation ð1Þ need not hold if worker referral simply economizes on recruit-
ment costs. An employer may optimally recruit a referred worker expected
to be of inferior quality if the cost savings exceeds the reduction in the value
of the recruit to the employer. It is possible for employers to expect the un-
observable quality of referred recruits to be worse than unreferred ones. But
if they do, they are more likely to insist on higher observables h such that
ð2Þ holds.
Height and chest circumference recorded at the time of recruitment are
taken as measures for h. Adult height is a widely used and viable indicator
of nutritional and health status ðWHO 1995Þ. Regarding chest circumfer-
ence, a positive correlation has been found with lung capacity, body mass, and
longevity. But the evidence remains contradictory, and the medical literature
nowadays largely disregards chest circumference as a predictor of ﬁtness ðYao
et al. 1991; Wu et al. 2009Þ. In early twentieth-century army recruitment,
however, chest circumference was, together with height, considered an impor-
tant and reliable indicator of physical ﬁtness ðPignet 1901Þ, and recruits had
to meet a minimum requirement. Similar principles were applied elsewhere
in British colonies, and chest circumference is also a good predictor of promo-
tion in the Kenya colonial army ðMoradi and Mylavarapu 2008Þ.
For d we use information on contractual performance as indicated by the
cause for termination recorded in the personnel ﬁle ðe.g., whether desertion,
inefﬁciency, medically unﬁt, or misconduct is listed as cause of dischargeÞ.
One may argue that recruits with better outside options were more likely to
desert. Worker productivity, however, is ﬁrm speciﬁc. From the perspective
of the army, deserters undo ﬁrm speciﬁc investments and, more importantly,
undermine morale and put military operations at risk—and hence were clearly
not desired.
C. Control Variables
Equation ð1Þ represents a correlation, not a causal relationship. Hence, we
avoid many of the complications induced by the difﬁculty of correctly iden-
tifying causal effects. But to reject screening, we need to compare workers
who are observationally identical at the time of recruiting and show that the
referred worker is differentially likely to desert or be dismissed. In other words,
we must control for characteristics of new recruits that are observable to the
employer. Failure to do so would lead to incorrect inference if the omitted
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characteristic is correlated with R—see the appendix on identiﬁcation for a
formal discussion.
We also need to control for time-varying factors, such as the onset of
World War I, which worsen employment conditions and affect the potential
recruitment pool—and thus raise the likelihood of poor performance ðe.g.,
desertionÞ—and which may be correlated with the use of referral as a re-
cruitment method. Similarly, referrals may be used to reach more remote pop-
ulations and more “amenable” communities, a confound that we deal with
by including ethnic group ﬁxed effects.15 Similar arguments can be made for
literacy, previous occupation, skills, and age of recruits—which were observed
by the army at the time of recruitment, may be predictors of unobserved qual-
ity, and may be correlated with recruitment by referral. Farmers, for instance,
were most likely to desert, whereas literate recruits were not. We therefore con-
trol for all characteristics that were recorded in writing at the time of recruit-
ment. The army deemed this information to be important for the recruitment
process, which is why its collection was institutionalized.
D. Opportunistic Behavior
So far we have assumed that referees do not behave in an opportunistic man-
ner and truthfully pass onto their employer the information at their disposal.
In practice, referees may misrepresent the information they have—or claim
to have. For instance, a soldier may recommend favorably someone he does
not know in order to get the reward. Another possibility is that the army puts
pressure on soldiers to bring new recruits, as seems to have happened some-
times, according to Killingray ð1982Þ. If this is true, we expect bringers to put
little effort into identifying high-quality recruits. They may also misrepresent
army life to new recruits in order to lure them into applying. Alternatively, the
referee may recommend a friend or relative he knows to be poorly qualiﬁed for
army work. Although these examples differ in terms of intent, we categorize
them all under the umbrella of “opportunistic referral.”
The army could in principle deter opportunistic referral by making the
bringer’s reward contingent on the recruit’s revealed quality. Historical rec-
ords do not show evidence of such practice. However, we cannot rule out the
possibility that the army penalized opportunistic bringers in terms of subse-
quent promotion. This, however, is a weak incentive for higher-ranked referees
who already reached the top of the career ladder.
15 During the study period, ethnicity is a very disaggregate geographic, economic, and community
marker. In our data set we have 81 ethnic groups, compared to 31 administrative regions at that time.
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Using referral as a screening device may still be optimal for the employer in
spite of opportunism, as long as E ½d j h; R 5 12 E ½d j h; R 5 0 remains
positive. But the more opportunistically referees behave, the lower the unob-
served quality of referred recruits, something that army recruiters may seek to
compensate for by insisting on higher observed characteristics h. We would
then observe referred recruits to be taller at the time of hiring but over time to
reveal themselves to be less disciplined. If, as is likely, the army correctly antic-
ipates this, referral only makes sense if it economizes on recruitment costs.
E. Desertion, Deterrence, and Referrals
As argued by Costa and Kahn ð2003Þ, desertion is a strong indicator of recruit
quality from the point of view of the army. Desertion is punishable, and the
punishment acts as a deterrent to desertion. Not every deserter was appre-
hended and punished, however.16 We expect the risk of apprehension to vary
with distance between place of birth and army base. In close-by villages the
army can better verify information provided on recruitment that later can lead
to the apprehension of deserters, such as the village of birth and the address
of relatives. In the case of recruiting parties, for example, this happens on site.
Moreover, the army might lack local knowledge and ﬁnd it too costly to search
for deserters in distant places.
Deterrence varied over time. During the war—especially in 1917–18—the
penalties for desertion were signiﬁcantly increased. These increased penalties
nevertheless have less deterrent effect on those runaway soldiers who can avoid
being found. This suggests a strategy for testing the deterrent effect of dis-
tance. Let a denote punishment inﬂicted on a deserter, conditional on being
found. Let f denote the probability of being found, which we assume to fall
with distance k between the recruit’s place of birth and his military base.
Expected punishment is af ðkÞ. The probability of desertion p is a decreasing
function of af ðkÞ. Now consider an increase in the penalty Da. How does this
increase affect deterrence as a function of distance? We have
yðDaf ðkÞÞ
yk
5 Daf 0ðkÞ < 0;
which means that an increase in the penalty has a stronger deterrent effect on
recruits posted near their place of origin. If we let f ðkÞ 5 b − f k, the above
16 A reward was paid for information that led to the apprehension of deserters. The rate of appre-
hension and conviction varied. In 1906, for example, 24 of 40 deserters were apprehended, whereas
7 of 50 deserters were apprehended in 1907. Report of the Inspector General, CO 445/24, The Na-
tional Archives, Kew.
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boils down to an interaction term between distance k and the change in
penalty Da. We expect the coefﬁcient of kDa to imply that the relationship
between distance and desertion increased with stricter penalties.
The risk of apprehension is likely to follow a different model for referred
soldiers, because the referee can verify information and help to locate the
runaway soldier irrespective of distance. The likelihood of punishment is thus
higher. This generates a confounding effect—a reason other than a higher
d to expect referred recruits to be less likely to desert. Consequently, other
things being equal, we expect a lower risk of desertion from referred recruits.
Of course, if referred recruits are less disciplined, they may be more likely to
desert in spite of the penalty. But this does not mean that the deterrence effect
of referral is absent. To investigate this possibility, we interact kDa with a
referral dummy: if a bringer can help locate a deserter irrespective of distance,
the coefﬁcient of this triple interaction term should be equal to minus the
coefﬁcient of kDa. We test this prediction in the data. The same argument
does not apply to dismissals, a prediction that we also test.
F. Chiefs
We focus the analysis on referral by fellow soldiers because it was remunerated
and is driven by individual motives. Referral by chiefs is subject to some of
the same issues as referral by soldiers: the army may have sought to reduce
recruitment costs, or it may have expected referred recruits to be of higher
quality because, through their networks, chiefs have access to information
about recruit quality.
Referral by chiefs is also subject to opportunism. Chiefs were pressured by
the army, but they also faced pressure by their subjects.17 As a result, they may
have referred dispensable men—such as troublemakers or men who did not
contribute much to food production. It follows that the same general testing
strategy applies, even if the evidence is potentially less convincing because we
have little information on chiefs, and the incentives they face are less clear-cut
and probably more political. Once in the army, recruits were treated equally.
Having men sent by chiefs included in the analysis improves precision.
V. Empirical Results
We begin by applying the testing strategy outlined in the previous section. We
then scrutinize the data in more detail for evidence of referee opportunism. At
the end of the section, we subject our results to various robustness checks.
17 In communication with army ofﬁcers, some chiefs pointed to the unpopularity of recruitment
measures and that they would risk destoolment when meeting their quota.
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A. Testing the Screening Motive
Our ﬁrst set of results, presented in table 3, focuses on recruit characteristics
observed at the time of recruitment. The dependent variables are height and
chest circumference measured at enlistment. In columns 1 and 3 we only
include dummies for the method of recruitment ði.e., referred by a fellow
soldier, sent by a traditional chief, or volunteeredÞ. The omitted category is
“no entry”—which refers to direct recruitment by the army, typically through
recruitment campaigns. Because health status may be correlated between re-
cruits of the same ethnic group, we cluster standard errors by ethnicity. Results
show a strong positive association between referral, height, and chest circum-
ference. In contrast, recruits sent by chiefs tend to be shorter with a smaller
chest circumference.
Changes in labor market conditions may be correlated with recruitment
methods. More pressure was put on traditional chiefs to send recruits during
World War I. The years 1917 and 1918 witnessed the largest buildup of the
colonial army to assist in the east African campaign. Some 81% of all sol-
diers in our data set were recruited during World War I, and 64% in 1917–
18 alone. The increased demand for soldiers was not met by referred recruits
ðﬁg. 1Þ. Moreover, referrals were more frequently used for young recruits,
many of whom were still growing and therefore had a lower height and chest
circumference.18 To correct for this, we reestimate the regressions with year of
TABLE 3
REFERRAL AND OBSERVABLE QUALITY
Height ðcmÞ Chest Circumference ðcmÞ
ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ
Referred by fellow soldier 1.152*** .575* .490* .039
ð.428Þ ð.320Þ ð.267Þ ð.191Þ
Sent by traditional chief −.977** .102 −.655 .575
ð.423Þ ð.429Þ ð.407Þ ð.347Þ
Volunteer .427 1.109** −.120 .865**
ð.489Þ ð.476Þ ð.445Þ ð.431Þ
Year of enlistment fixed effects Yes Yes
Age fixed effects ð14–23 yearsÞ Yes Yes
Number of observations 8,295 8,295 8,134 8,134
R2 .012 .091 .007 .143
Note. Estimator is ordinary least squares. All regressions include a constant. Robust standard errors in
parentheses clustered by ethnic group ð82 clustersÞ.
* p < .1.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
18 In well-nourished populations, most boys attain their ﬁnal adult height by age 18 ðWHO 1995Þ.
Under adverse nutritional and health conditions, however, body growth may continue until approx-
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enlistment and age ﬁxed effects. Results are shown in columns 2 and 4 of
table 3. The referral dummy remains positive but is no longer signiﬁcant for
chest circumference.
A potential source of bias is the former occupation of the new recruit. Some
61% of new recruits list farming as their former occupation. Given the eco-
nomic context of the time, we expect farmers to come from a poorer back-
ground and hence to be shorter than average. If bringers tend to recommend
fellow villagers, this could cause a bias. Similar concerns apply to ethnicity and
other observables at the time of recruitment.
We reestimate both regressions including the previous occupation infor-
mation available from army records. This includes dummies for whether the
recruit’s previous occupation was in farming or in the armed forces ð2%Þ. We
also include a literate dummy and skill index dummies. Only 7% of recruits
are listed as literate. To construct the skill index, we use information on the
recruit’s occupation before joining the army and rank the occupations from
1 to 5, from least to most complex. This constitutes our skill index.19
Results in columns 1 and 3 of table 4 show little change with respect to our
main variable of interest. Farmers are signiﬁcantly shorter than other recruits.
Literate recruits tend to be taller, but the coefﬁcient is not signiﬁcant at the
10% level. Skilled and literate recruits tend to have a smaller chest circum-
ference, a possible consequence of engaging in less strenuous work. In the eyes
of army recruiters, their skills may have compensated for perceived strength
deﬁciency.
Next we turn to characteristics that were not observable at recruitment but
are subsequently revealed through poor work performance. The two depen-
dent variables of interest are desertion and early dismissal as inefﬁcient or
medically unﬁt or for misconduct. In both cases, the event of interest unfolds
over time: the longer a recruit stays in the army, the longer the exposure to the
risk of deserting or being dismissed. To account for the length of exposure,
we estimate duration models. Results are presented in table 5.20 Coefﬁcients
are reported in the form of hazard ratios: estimates larger than 1 imply a higher
risk of desertion or dismissal, and vice versa for estimates smaller than 1. The
same regressors are used as in table 3.
imately age 23. The age groups 14–17 and 18–23 make up 3.4% and 43.2% of our sample; referrals
were used in 55% and 36% of the cases, respectively.
19 The classiﬁcation follows Armstrong ð1972Þ. For occupations falling into the ﬁve categories, see
table 1. Farmers were coded with a separate dummy variable.
20 Standard errors are clustered by ethnic group to allow for correlation in residuals. We also
estimated duration models stratifying by ethnic group to allow for a different baseline hazard for each
ethnic group. Results do not change.
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Results indicate that referred recruits and recruits sent by chiefs are at a
much higher risk of desertion or early dismissal. This suggests that referral did
not serve a screening purpose. There was a signiﬁcant drop in desertions
during World War I and 1917–18—probably because sanctions were much
TABLE 4
REFERRAL AND OBSERVABLE QUALITY—WITH CONTROLS
Height Chest Circumference
ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ
Recruiting channel:
Referred by fellow soldier .402* −.264
ð.223Þ ð.162Þ
Rank of bringer at the time of referral:
Low rank ðprivate, lance corporal, corporalÞ .199 −.380*
ð.259Þ ð.194Þ
High rank ðsergeant, company sergeant major,
regimental sergeant major, unknownÞ .552** −.179
ð.255Þ ð.182Þ
Sent by traditional chief .093 .097 .407** .409**
ð.261Þ ð.261Þ ð.179Þ ð.179Þ
Volunteer 1.093*** 1.097*** .826*** .829***
ð.322Þ ð.322Þ ð.258Þ ð.258Þ
Relatives in the army:
Recruit has relative in the army ð1 5 yesÞ −.696*** −.706*** .192 .185
ð.254Þ ð.254Þ ð.197Þ ð.197Þ
Bringer is kin ð1 5 yesÞ −.340 −.252 −.379 −.324
ð.481Þ ð.484Þ ð.372Þ ð.374Þ
Bringer ðyes 5 1Þ .120 .125 .523 .526
ð.482Þ ð.480Þ ð.359Þ ð.359Þ
Previous occupation:
Literate ðyes 5 1Þ .284 .278 −.537** −.540**
ð.314Þ ð.314Þ ð.237Þ ð.237Þ
Farmer −1.266* −1.279* −.054 −.057
ð.677Þ ð.677Þ ð.306Þ ð.306Þ
Armed forces ðpolice, armyÞ .471 .470 .764* .761*
ð.540Þ ð.540Þ ð.398Þ ð.398Þ
Skills in previous occupation fixed effects
ðfrom 1 unskilled to 5 skilledÞ Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other controls:
Motor transport unit ðyes 5 1Þ 1.601*** 1.613*** .541** .548**
ð.331Þ ð.331Þ ð.248Þ ð.248Þ
Age fixed effects ð14–23 yearsÞ Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of enlistment fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnic group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-test of equality in coefficients ðH0:
high rank 5 low rank; p-valueÞ .169 .288
Number of observations 7,827 7,827 7,682 7,682
R 2 .159 .160 .195 .195
Note. Estimator is ordinary least squares. All regressions include a constant. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.
* p < .1.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
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harsher. This does not, however, affect our results: as seen in columns 3 and
6 of table 5, results do not change when we include year of service ﬁxed effects.
As we did for table 3, we reestimate the regressions with occupation and
skill variables. We expect farmers to be more at risk of desertion, and this is for
several reasons. First, farming is a seasonal activity: soldiers may want to return
home to assist with the harvest, which conﬂicts with terms of employment in
the army. Second, the soldier may return to the village to take over the family
farm from an ailing or deceased parent. This makes us suspect that soldiers
with a farming background are more likely to desert. They may also slack in
their duties in the hope of being dismissed as inefﬁcient or unﬁt. Note that
skill and occupation are at least partly observable by army recruiters—and
what we know is what they put down in their records. If these characteristics
predict desertion, this was in principle observable to the employer at the time
of recruitment and should therefore have been taken into account at hiring.
When we reestimate the regressions in table 5 with these extra variables,
we ﬁnd that recruits with a farming background had the same higher risk of
desertion and dismissal as recruits that had an unskilled occupation before
entering the army ðreference categoryÞ. The referral dummy remains positive
and signiﬁcant for desertion, albeit with a smaller coefﬁcient.
Taken together, these results contradict the pure-screening model of referral:
referred recruits are at least as good—if not better—as unreferred recruits in
terms of observed characteristics such as height and chest circumference but
much worse in terms of unobservables, judging by their subsequent work
performance.
TABLE 5
REFERRAL AND UNOBSERVABLE QUALITY
Desertion Dismissal
ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ ð5Þ ð6Þ
Referred by fellow soldier 2.050*** 1.556*** 1.435*** 1.543*** 1.179* 1.089
ð5.405Þ ð4.039Þ ð3.188Þ ð4.825Þ ð1.717Þ ð.874Þ
Sent by traditional chief 1.905*** 1.734*** 1.755*** 1.983*** 1.787*** 1.759***
ð3.680Þ ð3.635Þ ð3.820Þ ð5.794Þ ð5.303Þ ð5.568Þ
Volunteer 1.316 1.190 1.240 1.127 1.008 1.015
ð1.471Þ ð.923Þ ð1.179Þ ð.671Þ ð.050Þ ð.092Þ
Age at enlistment fixed effects
ð14 –23 yearsÞ Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of enlistment fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of service fixed effects Yes Yes
Number of failures ðdesertions/
dismissalsÞ 914 914 914 1,333 1,333 1,333
Note. Cox proportional hazard model. Reported coefﬁcients are hazard ratios; z-values in parentheses;
standard errors clustered by ethnic group. Number of subjects 5 7,825.
* p < .1.
*** p < .01.
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B. Referee Behavior
The results presented so far raise the possibility of referee opportunism. We
now investigate this idea in more detail. We begin by looking for circum-
stantial evidence of collusion between bringer and recruit, a particularly per-
nicious form of opportunism. Suppose the bringer and recruit agree to collect
the reward and then desert. Given that a percentage of a soldier’s salary is only
returned at the time of discharge, the ﬁnancial penalty for deserting increases
over time. We would therefore expect collusion to show up in the form of a
higher incidence of desertion among refereed recruits shortly after hiring.
To investigate this possibility, we plot in ﬁgure 3 the Kaplan-Meyer survival
function, that is, the proportion of new recruits who do not desert against the
time since the beginning of their contract. We observe a relatively rapid fall
in survival rate at the beginning of the contract, consistent with the idea that
those who decide they do not like the army leave early. But the ﬁgure also
shows no difference between referred and unreferred recruits up to 6 months
after hiring. It is only after 6 months that we observe a higher desertion rate
among referred recruits. We therefore ﬁnd no prima facie evidence that referee
and recruit collude to defraud the army of the bringer’s reward.21 This is, of
course, only one extreme form of untruthful refereeing.
In the Montgomery model, high-quality workers are assumed to know
other high-quality workers. It is this correlation that makes referral useful for
screening new candidates. This correlation, however, implicitly assumes that
the referee truthfully reports information he has about the quality of new
recruits. We have information on the rank of the bringer at the time of the
referral, an index of quality. In the context of the British colonial army over the
study period, indigenous soldiers—and hence bringers—occupied only ﬁve
ranks. Army records show the rank of the bringer at the time of the referral to
be private ð31% of referred recruitsÞ, lance corporal ð11%Þ, corporal ð9%Þ,
sergeant ð21%Þ, CSM ð16%Þ, or RSM ð3%Þ.22 If the Montgomery model is
correct for our data, higher-ranked bringers should bring better recruits. In
contrast, if referees behave opportunistically, higher-ranked servicemen may
have found it easier to force the hand of army recruiters. In our context, this
means getting the bringer’s reward even when the proposed recruit is of worse
quality. Of course, the army may retaliate against a bringer whose recruits
turned out to be unsuitable. It is highly unlikely that the army awarded a
21 From the data set we could match 726 bringer-recruit pairs. From the 93 recruits who deserted, in
only two cases did the bringer also desert. These two bringers deserted 85 days and 161 days earlier
than their referred recruit, respectively.
22 Percentages do not sum to 100 because in some cases the rank is missing or not clear from the
record ðe.g., malam, pay clerk, orderly room clerk, headmanÞ.
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reduction in rank, and we have not found a single documented case of this
in available sources. Referring unsuitable recruits did not fall into offense
categories listed in army regulations that were punishable with reduction.
Moreover, for such a punishment, direct intention needs to be proven, which
would be difﬁcult. Hence the strongest penalty that can credibly be imposed is
delayed promotion. This penalty, however, would have little or no effect on
sergeants and CSMs given that, in the colonial army, these were the highest
ranks African soldiers could hope to reach. If referees behave opportunisti-
cally, we therefore expect higher-ranked bringers to bring recruits of lower
ðnot higherÞ unobserved quality—in reaction to which the army may insist on
better observable characteristics.
The attestation papers also report whether the new recruit was a relative
of the bringer. This concerns 3% of all recruits but 8% of all those referred.
We expect referees to have better information about the unobserved quality
of their relatives—and hence to be able to recommend among their relatives
those who are better suited for army work. Bringers may, however, be pres-
sured by relatives to provide a recommendation ðas in Beaman and Magruder
2012Þ—or, if they are facing a lot of pressure from ofﬁcers to bring recruits,
they may pressure relatives to join. In either of these cases, we expect the
quality of new recruits to be worse when they are recommended by a relative.
Figure 3. Kaplan-Meyer survival function
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By the same reasoning, recruit quality should be lower for those with relatives
in the army who may indirectly have favored their candidacy or encouraged
them to join. Some 15% of recruits are recorded as having a relative in the
army. This is a high proportion, so we expect the term “relative” to have been
interpreted rather loosely ðe.g., as synonymous for kinshipÞ.
We test these predictions by adding dummies for whether the bringer is kin
and for whether the recruit has relatives in the army. Results for height and
chest circumference are presented in table 4. From columns 1 and 3 we see
that recruits with family ties in the army are hired despite being of signiﬁ-
cantly shorter height. New recruits explicitly referred by a relative are shorter
and have a smaller chest circumference—consistent with favoritism—but the
coefﬁcient is not statistically signiﬁcant. In columns 2 and 4 we add dum-
mies for high- and low-rank bringer. We ﬁnd that recruits referred by higher-
ranked soldiers tend to be taller and have a larger chest circumference than
recruits referred by low-ranked soldiers, although the difference in the ranks is
not statistically signiﬁcant.
Next we turn to unobserved characteristics d. In table 6 we ﬁnd some evi-
dence of favoritism: recruits with family ties in the army were hired even
though they are more likely to be dismissed. This is a general observation and
is not limited to cases in which a kin was listed as bringer, and it stands in
contrast to the ﬁndings reported by Costa and Kahn ð2003Þ for US Civil War
units. In columns 2 and 4 of table 6 we see that recruits brought by a high-
rank bringer are more likely to desert than those brought by a lower-ranked
soldier. We do not ﬁnd a similar pattern for dismissals however.
The desertion results from table 6 indicate that higher-ranked referees bring
recruits of lower unobserved quality. This ﬁnding is consistent with the idea
that referees behave opportunistically and that a higher-rank bringer can no
longer be punished by being denied promotion. This can also explain our ear-
lier observation from table 4 that recruits referred by higher-ranked soldiers
have higher observable characteristics—army recruiters may be compensating
for lower anticipated unobserved quality.
C. Desertion and Deterrence
To summarize, we have found some evidence consistent with referee oppor-
tunism but no evidence that worker referral improves screening on unob-
servable characteristics. We now investigate whether soldier referral may nev-
ertheless serve a monitoring purpose. Given that bringer and recruit are rarely
assigned to the same unit, the bringer is unlikely to play a role in day-to-
day monitoring. The bringer may nevertheless help locate a deserting recruit,
and thus may help deter desertion. We have already seen that, on average, this
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TABLE 6
REFERRAL AND UNOBSERVABLE QUALITY—WITH CONTROLS
Desertion Dismissal
ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ
Recruiting channel:
Referred by fellow soldier 1.268** .973
ð2.188Þ ð−.300Þ
Rank of bringer at the time of referral:
Low rank ðprivate, lance corporal, corporalÞ 1.101 .978
ð.748Þ ð−.210Þ
High rank ðsergeant, company sergeant major,
regimental sergeant major, unknownÞ 1.391*** .969
ð2.862Þ ð−.312Þ
Sent by traditional chief 1.489*** 1.496*** 1.391*** 1.390***
ð3.266Þ ð3.301Þ ð3.099Þ ð3.094Þ
Volunteer 1.044 1.052 1.087 1.087
ð.245Þ ð.287Þ ð.525Þ ð.523Þ
Bringer ðyes 5 1Þ 1.200 1.205 .883 .883
ð.695Þ ð.710Þ ð−.629Þ ð−.631Þ
Relatives in the army:
Recruit has relative in the army ðyes 5 1Þ 1.043 1.028 1.186** 1.187**
ð.367Þ ð.244Þ ð2.006Þ ð2.010Þ
Bringer is kin ðyes 5 1Þ .973 1.042 1.342** 1.339*
ð−.141Þ ð.216Þ ð1.995Þ ð1.959Þ
Previous occupation:
Literate ðyes 5 1Þ .807 .803 .957 .957
ð−1.243Þ ð−1.271Þ ð−.304Þ ð−.302Þ
Farmer 1.114 1.112 2.245 2.245
ð.243Þ ð.239Þ ð1.450Þ ð1.451Þ
Armed forces ðpolice, armyÞ .922 .904 1.089 1.089
ð−.250Þ ð−.306Þ ð.357Þ ð.358Þ
Skills in previous occupation fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other controls:
Motor transport unit ðyes 5 1Þ .679* .688* .823 .823
ð−1.766Þ ð−1.708Þ ð−.995Þ ð−.997Þ
Height ðcmÞ 1.006 1.006 1.004 1.004
ð1.125Þ ð1.114Þ ð.784Þ ð.786Þ
Chest circumference ðcmÞ 1.010 1.010 .984** .984**
ð1.374Þ ð1.355Þ ð−2.368Þ ð−2.364Þ
Year of enlistment fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of service fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age at enlistment fixed effects ð14–23 yearsÞ Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnic group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
x2 test of equality in hazards ðH0: high rank 5
low rank; p-valueÞ .03 .92
Number of failures ðdesertions/dismissalsÞ 844 844 1,188 1,188
Note. Cox proportional hazard model. Reported coefﬁcients are hazard ratios; z-values in parentheses;
standard errors clustered by ethnic group. Number of subjects 5 7,141.
* p < .1.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
deterrence effect is not so strong that it reduces desertion among referred
recruits. But this may be because deterrence only affects a subgroup of recruits.
The purpose of this section is to investigate this possibility.
We begin by establishing that the risk of desertion increases with distance
between a recruit’s place of attestation and his place of origin. The rationale is
that it is easier for the army to ﬁnd and bring back those who run away to a
nearby village. Regression results, not shown here to save space, indicate that,
for Ghanaian recruits, the likelihood of desertion increases with the distance
between place of attestation and place of origin. This ﬁnding does not carry
over to the full sample, however. This is hardly surprising given that men re-
turning to their villages outside Ghana ðe.g., in French West Africa or Libe-
riaÞ were beyond British jurisdiction.
Findings are reported in table 7 using only recruits of Ghanaian origin.
Columns 1 and 4 report coefﬁcient estimates without distance. These are
given for comparison purposes only.23 In columns 2 and 5 we introduce dis-
tance k and an interaction term between k and referral. We ﬁnd that distance
is associated with a higher likelihood of desertion and dismissal, but this as-
sociation is more than neutralized for referred recruits. This is consistent with
the idea that distant recruits that are referred can be located more easily and
hence, other things being equal, are less likely to desert than unreferred dis-
tant recruits. Also note the sharp increase in the hazard ratio of the refer-
ral dummy after controlling for the desertion deterrence effect of referrals
with respect to distance: once we control for the deterrence effect of referral,
the effect of referral on desertion is much larger.
Next we introduce an interaction term kDa, where Da is proxied by 1917–
18 when the war intensiﬁed and desertion was punished more severely. We
also interact kDa with referral. Results are presented in table 7 columns 3 and
6. For desertion we ﬁnd, as expected, that the disincentive effect of proximity
is stronger when desertion is punished more severely. This is apparent from
observing that the coefﬁcient of kDa is larger than 1 and strongly signiﬁcant.
The direct effect of Da itself, however, is a strong reduction in the likelihood
of desertion, as evidenced by a coefﬁcient of the “serving in 1917–18” dummy
far below 1. The interaction term between referral and kDa shows, as an-
ticipated, an odds ratio well below 1 for desertion.
Turning to dismissal, we ﬁnd that the likelihood of dismissal increases with
the distance between military base and place of origin. This suggests that the
army may have dismissed recruits who perhaps could not be prevented from
23 The referral coefﬁcient is nonsigniﬁcant. Note, however, that the hazard ratio is only slightly
smaller than in table 6, col. 1, whereas sample size and number of desertions is much reduced.
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deserting. Again we ﬁnd that this relationship does not apply to referred sol-
diers. In contrast to desertion, we ﬁnd no evidence of a 1917–18 effect: the
coefﬁcients of both kDa and its interaction with referral are not statistically
signiﬁcant. This is not surprising: dismissal is initiated by the army, and dur-
ing the war all available soldiers were needed, even those who were less efﬁ-
cient or less ﬁt. To summarize, the results are consistent with a deterrence
effect of referral on desertion but not on dismissal.
D. Further Robustness Analysis
Before concluding, we investigate whether the patterns documented here are
robust or whether they are driven by speciﬁc observations. First, we examine
whether our results are driven by a small number of very active referees. To
this effect, we exclude recruits who were brought by recruiters who referred
more than nine new recruits in total, and we reestimate the regressions pre-
sented in tables 4 and 6. The total number of referred recruits drops by 30%.
Regression results on height and chest circumference, not reported here to
save space, are very similar to those reported earlier. Regression results on
desertion and dismissal conﬁrm earlier results and indicate a higher likelihood
of desertion and dismissal among referred recruits. We also ﬁnd that recruits
brought by higher-ranked soldiers are more likely to desert. The effect, how-
TABLE 7
REFERRAL AND UNOBSERVABLE QUALITY—WITH DISTANCE (GHANAIAN RECRUITS ONLY)
Desertion Dismissal
ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ ð5Þ ð6Þ
Referred by fellow soldier 1.189 1.929*** 1.672* 1.060 1.803** 1.851**
ð.925Þ ð2.726Þ ð1.934Þ ð.339Þ ð2.556Þ ð2.541Þ
Distance ðin 100 kmÞ between place
of birth and:
Military base ðplace of certificateÞ 1.129** .958 1.148*** 1.171**
ð2.325Þ ð−.427Þ ð3.290Þ ð2.339Þ
Military base  referred .798*** .933 .830*** .817***
ð−3.028Þ ð−.615Þ ð−3.273Þ ð−2.729Þ
Military base  serving in 1917–18 1.225** .975
ð1.990Þ ð−.353Þ
Military base  serving in 1917–18
 referred .833 1.012
ð−1.396Þ ð.153Þ
Number of failures ðdesertions/
dismissalsÞ 390 390 390 539 539 539
Note. Cox proportional hazard model. Reported coefﬁcients are hazard ratios; robust z-values in paren-
theses. Controls as in table 6, col. 1; coefﬁcient in col. 1 differs from table 6, col. 1, due to restriction of the
sample to Ghanaian recruits only. Number of subjects 5 3,445.
* p < .1.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
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ever, is less strong than before, possibly because those who bring many recruits
hold higher ranks.
We also check whether the assumption about termination date affects our
ﬁndings. Because missing information on date of discharge is nonrandom, we
reestimate the duration models with a selection correction using the method
proposed by Boehmke, Morey, and Shannon ð2006Þ. Results are conﬁrmed.24
To conclude this section, we investigate whether the quality of referred
recruits varies with the average incidence of desertion and dismissal before the
date of enlistment of the new recruit. The idea is that, if desertion is relatively
common, the potential for opportunistic referral is higher since, presumably,
penalties for bringing an unsuitable recruit will be lower when the quality of
new recruits is generally poor.
It is reasonable to assume that bringers had some idea of desertion rates
prevailing at the time of referral. They may therefore respond to the deterio-
ration of the selection process by bringing less suitable recruits. We test this
idea by including as additional regressor on the desertion rate in the 12 months
preceding the recruit’s enlistment, and we interact this regressor with the
referral dummy. The total number of new recruits is also included as addi-
tional control, to avoid spurious inference due to changes in recruitment
levels. Results, shown in table 8, indicate that referred recruits are more likely
to subsequently desert when the incidence of desertion was high in the pe-
riod immediately preceding their recruitment. Although it is difﬁcult to as-
sess statistical signiﬁcance due to multicollinearity, the result is again consistent
with referee opportunism.25 There is no such pattern for dismissals.
E. Discussion
We have organized our testing strategy primarily focusing on the screening
role potentially played by referral. Kugler ð2003Þ has proposed an alternative
model in which employee referral is used as a way to save on monitoring costs
and to elicit effort from referred employees. We have already discussed this
issue brieﬂy in Section III, but we revisit it in more detail here.
For the monitoring motive to be relevant for our context, the referred sol-
dier should be placed under the direct or indirect supervision of the referee
so that his effort can be monitored. This simple observation could in princi-
ple serve as a basis for distinguishing between the monitoring and screening
motives for the army using worker referral.
24 For details, see online app. C.
25 The correlation between the referral dummy and its interaction with the desertion rate in the past
12 months is very high.
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Although we have no information on the unit to which a new recruit was
sent after his 6 months of training, the limited information available sug-
gests that monitoring by the bringer is unlikely to have been important. We
ﬁrst note that, if the army intended bringers to monitor the new recruits they
brought in, we would expect a fair amount of ethnic homogeneity within
army units, given that bringers tend to recommend people from the same
origin. We ﬁnd no evidence of this. Army units were ethnically diverse. The
lingua francas used in the colonial army were Hausa and English—neither of
which is indigenous to Ghana ðKillingray 1982Þ.26 On the basis of informa-
tion available on the unit and the ethnicity of bringers, we calculated the
Herﬁndahl index of eight army units. The weighted average index is 0.08,
which means that if we had taken two soldiers at random from the same
unit, they only had an 8% chance of being from the same ethnic group.
We also check whether bringers tend to come from training units where
they could have monitored new recruits during their 6-month training period.
From available data of 1,107 referrals, only 15 were from soldiers in training
units. This compares to a much larger number of referrals ð270Þ from soldiers
in units organizationally separated from the GCR and who thus could not
26 We know of one “Ashanti Company.” Ashanti soldiers disliked following orders from ofﬁcers of
northern origin, whom they regarded as of lower status given that slaves were historically drawn from
those ethnicities ðKillingray 1982Þ.
TABLE 8
REFERRAL AND UNOBSERVABLE QUALITY—WITH INCIDENCE OF DESERTION/DISMISSAL BEFORE RECRUITMENT
Desertion Dismissal
ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ
Referral by fellow soldier .967 .935
ð−.105Þ ð−.424Þ
Incidence of desertion and dismissal:
Desertion rate in the 12 months before enlistment .975 .977
ð−.798Þ ð−.936Þ
Desertion rate in the last 12 months × referred 1.034 1.030**
ð.885Þ ð2.343Þ
Dismissal rate in the 12 months before enlistment .987 .990
ð−.768Þ ð−.654Þ
Dismissal rate in the last 12 months × referred 1.006 1.001
ð.438Þ ð.169Þ
Time at risk 12 months before enlistment 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
ð1.371Þ ð1.380Þ ð−1.068Þ ð−1.139Þ
Number of failures ðdesertions/dismissalsÞ 844 844 1,188 1,188
Note. Cox proportional hazard model. Reported coefﬁcients are hazard ratios; robust z-values in paren-
theses. Controls as in table 6, col. 1. Number of subjects 5 7,141.
** p < .05.
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have monitored new recruits at all.27 We reestimate tables 4 and 6 with an
additional dummy if the bringer no longer was in the army at the time of
recruitment. Results, not reported here to save space, are either not signiﬁcant
or not robust across speciﬁcations—possibly due to small sample size.
We conclude that there is no evidence in favor of the day-to-day moni-
toring hypothesis, apart from the evidence we have reported earlier that the
bringer may have played a role in helping locate deserting soldiers. Taken
together, the evidence indicates that, if the army was hoping to enlist the help
of the referee to monitor and incentivize new recruits, this objective was not
achieved: if anything, referred recruits were more likely to desert or be dis-
missed because of low productivity ðe.g., misconduct or inefﬁciencyÞ. These
ﬁndings should thus be construed as rejecting both the pure-monitoring and
pure-screening models of employee referral.
This leaves open the question of why the colonial army resorted to em-
ployee referral—and paid soldiers for bringing new recruits. The most likely
explanation is the need to economize on recruitment costs. During our study
period, the colonial army used a variety of methods to bring in new recruits.
The method that brought the best recruits was direct recruitment in villages.
Given low population densities, paucity of roads, and lack of transportation at
the time, this must have been expensive. The colonial administration was not
willing to spend much for the army and kept the peacetime strength of the
Ghanaian army small relative to the vast territory that it had to secure and
protect. Asking traditional chiefs as well as enlisted soldiers to send in new
recruits must have saved on recruitment costs, even if it lowered the reliabil-
ity of recruits. Furthermore, recruits brought by fellow soldiers were on aver-
age better than those sent by chiefs, and army recruiters were in a position to
compensate somewhat for their lower unobserved quality by insisting on bet-
ter observable characteristics such as height and chest circumference. These
observations militate in favor of a simple transactions cost explanation for
employee referral by the colonial army.
This raises the issue of the generalizability of our results. Although the size
of the Ghanaian colonial army was determined by political considerations,
recruitment methods were probably chosen so as to minimize costs. The co-
lonial army faced difﬁculties attracting recruits from alternative employment in
farming, mining, and the informal sector. In an environment in which em-
27 One hundred twelve bringers were in the reserve, in which servicemen were organized after
completion of regular military service, and 158 bringers were in the Northern Territories Con-
stabulary, an armed police unit based in northern Ghana.
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ployers compete for workers, the cost savings should go to workers. Mont-
gomery’s model allows employers to offer higher start-up wages to workers
hired through employee referral. This is not what happened in the army in
Ghana: new recruits were offered a standard contract that was identical irre-
spective of recruitmentmethod.WhetherMontgomery’s assumption is realistic
thus depends on the legal context.
In many developed economies, paying a new worker more because he or
she was recommended by an existing employee would be considered dis-
criminatory—and banned by law. An alternative competitive equilibrium,
which is not considered by Montgomery but could be ﬁtted in the same
framework, gives the cost savings to the bringer, either in cash—as the colonial
army did—or in kind through perks or promotion. The results presented here
show that rewarding the bringer generates perverse incentive effects that, in
our case, were strong enough to undo whatever screening and monitoring
beneﬁts employee referral is supposed to convey.
VI. Conclusion
Using information compiled from army personnel records, we tested whether
the referral system in place in the British colonial army in Ghana served to
better screen recruits for characteristics unobserved at hiring. We found that
the referral system in place did not lead to a selection of recruits with high
unobservable quality: referred recruits were taller and had a larger chest cir-
cumference—two observable qualities recorded by army recruiters at the time
of hiring—but were signiﬁcantly more likely to desert and to be discharged as
medically unﬁt or inefﬁcient or for misconduct. These ﬁndings are difﬁcult to
reconcile with a screening model of referral. They are also inconsistent with
the idea, proposed, for instance, by Kugler ð2003Þ, that employers resort to
employee referral with the understanding that referees monitor new recruits.
We do, however, ﬁnd some evidence that referral lowers the likelihood of
desertion for those recruits posted far from their place of origin, suggesting
that referral played some useful role in locating and bringing back deserters.
This ﬁnding can be interpreted as a form of monitoring beneﬁt from referral.
We ﬁnd some evidence to support the hypothesis of referee opportunism.
In particular, the unobserved quality of new recruits is worse when the bringer
had reached a rank with fewer promotion prospects. We also ﬁnd that the
unobservable quality of referred recruits falls more at times when the pro-
portion of bad recruits is high. Both results are suggestive of opportunistic
behavior on the part of referees. We do not, however, ﬁnd evidence of col-
lusion between bringer and recruit to defraud the army, and we only ﬁnd
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limited evidence of nepotism insofar as new recruits with a kin in the army
were accepted even though their lower-than-average height was ex ante ob-
servable and they had a higher risk of dismissal.
These results are consistent with a model of opportunistic referral in which
army recruiters are aware of the incentive problem and seek to compensate
the lower unobservables of referred recruits with higher observables. Ref-
eree opportunism begs the question as to why an employer would rely on the
practice if it knew that it yielded lower-quality workers. In the case of the Gold
Coast Regiment, referrals by fellow soldiers did not produce the worst results:
recruits sent by traditional chiefs are worse in all dimensions. The ﬁnancial cost
of using employee referrals may have been lower compared to other recruit-
ment channels, especially recruitment campaigns in the villages. The political
cost was also lower since referred recruits could be classiﬁed as having vol-
unteered ðKillingray 1982Þ. This can explain why the colonial army made use
of employee referrals in spite of the lack of evidence that it improved worker
screening or served more than a subsidiary monitoring role.
Although our ﬁndings are speciﬁc to an employer and moment in time,
they cast doubt on the idea that employee referral always serves a useful
screening or monitoring role. Our ﬁndings are more in line with those of
Bentolila et al. ð2010Þ, who ﬁnd that referred workers receive lower wages but
spend less time unemployed, and especially with those of Beaman and Ma-
gruder ð2012Þ, who, in an experimental setting, ﬁnd direct evidence of ref-
eree opportunism.
The situation of the colonial army in the early twentieth century is not too
dissimilar from the situation of present-day employers of indigenous unskilled
workers newly arrived in Africa—such as Chinese and other Asian investors in
mining and plantations. Like the Ghanaian colonial army, these employers
wish to identify loyal and disciplined workers. Recent press suggests that they
do not always succeed. Our article outlines the limits of the usefulness of using
worker referral in this context.
Appendix
Identification
Here, we present a more detailed and theoretically based motivation of our
testing strategy. The focus is on identiﬁcation. Consider an employer facing a
large pool of potential recruits with unknown employer-speciﬁc productivity
eq with probability distribution function gðqÞ. For exogenous reasons ðe.g.,
considerations of fairness, loyalty, and political legitimacyÞ, we assume that
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this employer must offer all new recruits the same wage and allocate them to
the same undifferentiated task.
The employer wishes to select the recruits with the highest productivity.
If productivity is observable, the employer simply selects all recruits with pro-
ductivity above a threshold qmin. Thus, qmin is the productivity of the mar-
ginal worker who is hired. The average productivity of hired workers is
E ½eq j q ≥ qmin5 E`
qmin
q f ðqÞ dq;
that is, it is the average of the truncated distribution of eq above qmin. When
the employer needs to rapidly expand its workforce, it needs to set a lower
threshold q 0min < qmin. It follows that
E ½eq j q ≥ qmin > E ½eq j q ≥ q 0min:
When the pool of recruits changes over time, the threshold must also adjust
so that the employer can ﬁnd the new recruits it needs.
Now let productivity be an increasing function of two ðsets of Þ variables h
and d such that q 5 f ðh, d Þ with y2q=yhyd ≤ 0 ði.e., h and d are substitutesÞ.
Variable h is observable to the employer at the time of hiring, d is not. In
addition, the employer observes a signal v that is informative about d—and
thus about productivity. Without loss of generality, let the signal be deﬁned
such that E ½d  is increasing in v. Given this, the optimal policy for the em-
ployer is to set a signal threshold locus vminðhÞ below which recruits are not
hired. Furthermore, since h and d are substitutes, vminðhÞ is a decreasing func-
tion of observable characteristic h. Put differently, the employer sets a higher
minimum signal to recruit workers with a lower h—and vice versa.
The main difference with the full observability model is that now the em-
ployer occasionally hires workers whose realized productivity is below what is
necessary for the job. Given this, we expect to observe some workers either to
defect because the work is too arduous or to be dismissed by the employer
for poor performance. We assume that this is costly for the employer.
As in the full observability case, hiring more recruits requires lowering the
threshold locus to, say, v0minðhÞ. It is easy to see that we have
E ½eq j h; v ≥ vminðhÞ > E ½eq j h; v ≥ v0minðhÞ;
that is, lowering the threshold results in lower average productivity. It follows
that if the employer rapidly expands recruitment, we expect a subsequent in-
crease in dismissals and defections.
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Screening through Referral
We now introduce the possibility of remunerated worker referral. Let R5 1 if
a recruit is referred and R 5 0 otherwise. We now assume that R contains
additional information that helps predict d ði.e., that d 5 dðv, RÞÞ. At the
margin, the employer is willing to pay reward t to a referee for a recruit with
characteristics ðhref, vrefÞ if
E ½qðh; dðv; RÞÞ j href ; vref ; R 5 12 t
≥ E ½qðh; dðv; RÞÞ j href ; vref ; R 5 0;
which implies
E ½qðh; dðv; RÞÞ j href ; vref ; R 5 1
> E ½qðh; d ðv; RÞÞ j href ; vref ; R 5 0:
ðA1Þ
Any referred job applicant who does not satisfy this requirement is not hired
by the employer—and the reward t is not paid. It immediately follows that
R 5 1 must predict better performance q. In other words, the fact that a job
applicant is referred must be interpreted by the employer as a positive in-
formative signal for the employer to agree to remunerate referral. This could
naturally arise because, as assumed by Montgomery ð1991Þ, “birds of a feather
ﬂock together”: referring workers who have demonstrated their productivity
by not defecting or being dismissed know potential recruits who, on average,
also have better productivity—and dðv; R 5 1Þ ≥ dðv; R 5 0Þ. Alternatively,
it could be because referees exert effort in identifying suitable recruits in order
to obtain the reward t. Whatever the reason, if being referred is not informa-
tive, the employer should not offer a reward. If referral predicts lower per-
formance, we should not observe it ði.e., job applicants would apply without
providing a referralÞ.
Equation ðA1Þ is the basis for our testing strategy: if referral conveys pos-
itive information about unobserved quality over and above href and vref ðwhich
in this model it should, since it is remuneratedÞ, then the average performance
of referred workers should be higher than that of unreferred workers condi-
tional on the information ðhref, vrefÞ observable to the employer at the time of
recruitment.
To demonstrate why we need to control for href and vref for our test to be
identiﬁed, imagine that we do not. If referees on average know better workers,
we expect E ½h j R 5 1 ≥ E ½h j R 5 0 and E ½v j R 5 1 ≥ E ½v j R 5 0 ði.e.,
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referred workers should be better than unreferred ones on observablesÞ. It
follows that, in this case, it is possible that
E ½qðh; dðv; RÞÞ j R 5 1 > E ½qðh; dðv; RÞÞ j R 5 0;
even though
E ½qðh; d ðv; RÞÞ j href ; vref ; R 5 12 t
< E ½qðh; dðv; RÞÞ j href ; vref ; R 5 0:
Put differently, if we do not control for the determinants of productivity that
the employer observes at recruitment, we could erroneously ascribe an infor-
mational beneﬁt to referral.
The reverse is more likely in equilibrium. For all recruits who are strictly
above the threshold ðh, vminðhÞÞ, the employer does not need the additional
information provided by referral—and thus has no reason to remunerate ref-
erees for it. Referral is only useful to the employer for marginal workers, that
is, for workers who would not be employed if there were not referred. It fol-
lows that the set of workers who are recruited as a result of referral should, in
equilibrium, have lower h and v than workers hired without referral. In this
case, not conditioning on h and v would result in
E ½qðh; d ðv; RÞÞ j R 5 1 < E ½qðh; dðv; RÞÞ j R 5 0:
We would erroneously conclude that referral is correlated with lower pro-
ductivity when in fact, among marginal recruits with low h and v, it is cor-
related positively with it.
Economizing on Recruitment Costs
The situation is different if referral is not used as a screening device but as a
way of economizing on recruitment costs. To capture this idea, let c be the
marginal cost to the employer of identifying an additional recruit on its own.
In the context of our study, this typically means ﬁelding a recruitment cam-
paign in the countryside at a time when the population is scarce and dispersed
and transportation is difﬁcult. Let er be the cost of identifying an additional
recruit for workers who are already employed. Assume that for some workers
r < c : these workers can identify employable recruits among their acquain-
tances and kinsmen.
Now suppose that the employer offers a reward t < c for referring a suitable
worker, that is, for bringing a recruit with observables ðh, vÞ above the thresh-
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old ðh, vminðhÞÞ. Workers whose search cost r < t have an incentive to refer,
and the employer has an incentive to pay the reward for referral. In this case
referral conveys no information advantage.
It is also possible that referred workers are on average worse than the re-
cruits the employer identiﬁes by incurring the recruitment cost c. This could
arise because of opportunistic or favoritist referral or for other reasons. In this
case, referred workers are worse than normal recruits conditional on observ-
ables; that is, we have
E ½qðh; dðv; RÞÞ j href ; vref ; R 5 1
< E ½qðh; dðv; RÞÞ j href ; vref ; R 5 0
because dðv; R 5 1Þ < dðv; R 5 0Þ. If the employer anticipates this, a higher
threshold ðh; vrefminðhÞÞ should be applied to referred workers to compensate.
For instance, the employer may only hire referred applicants who have a
particularly high h. In this case we will observe that, conditional on h and v,
the performance of referred recruits will be worse than unreferred recruits, but
referred recruits will have more desirable observed characteristics on average.
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